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THE TAX TREATMENT OF CHARITIES
AND CHARITABLE DONATIONS
SINCE THE CARTER COMMISSION:
PAST REFORMS AND
PRESENT PROBLEMS*
By FAYB L. WOODMAN"
I. INTRODUCTION
From the time of the Carter Commission to the present,
there have been a number of major 'reforms' in the tax treatment
of charities and charitable donations. This paper will critically
examine those reforms and comment on some present problems.
The basic premise of this paper is that, for better or for worse, the
charitable sector in Canada will, for the foreseeable future, be
subsidized through the tax system. This assumption also underlies
the recommendations of the Carter Repot 1 and the legislative
proposals, some implemented and some not, of the past twenty years.
Copyright, Faye L. Woodman, 1988.
**Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University.
'Canada, Royal Commission on Taxation, Report (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966) (Chair.
K. LeM. Carter) [hereinafter Report].
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The absence of any significant debate in the Carter Repol,
the 1975 Green Paper,2 and the 1983 Discussion Paper3 on whether
the tax exemption for charities and the charitable donation deduction
should be retained probably reflects societal consensus in favour of
those tax concessions. The consensus, it is suggested here, is the
result of a number of generally held beliefs about the nature and
role of charitable giving and charitable activities. First, there is a
reluctance to view a charitable donation as "consumption"4 of a
taxpayer. This position, which is not unsupported in the tax
literature,5 draws a line between "private, preclusive, household
consumption"6 and expenditure that results in the production of
"common or social goods or services."7 In the latter formulation, the
charitable deduction is logically an integral part of an ideal income
tax system.
Second, the existence of tax concessions for charities is often
justified on the basis that an important function of charities in
Canada is to 'fill in the gaps'. In other words, charities do those
things that government would otherwise have to do. In addition,
many people believe that charities are more efficient, creative and
innovative than government. In that case, not only do charities save
the taxpayer money, but they provide better quality.
Finally, charities are said to provide a counterbalance to big
government and big business: They encourage the development of
2Canada, Department of Finance, The Tar Treatment of Charities (Ottawa: Dept. of
Finance, 1975).
3 Canada, Department of Finance, Charities and the Canadian Tax System: A Discussion
Paper (Ottawa: Dept. of Finance, 1983).
4Henry Simons's classic definition of income is as follows: "Personal income may be
defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and
(2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of
the period in question." Personal Income Taxation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1938) at 50.
5See, for example, W.D. Andrews, "Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax"
(1972-73) 86 Harv. L. Rev. 309.
61bid at 363.
71bid at 357.
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alternative strategies to deal with social and economic problems.
They favour individual initiative and autonomy, while at the same
time emphasizing mutual assistance and cooperation in the
community. Hence charities, it is argued, reinforce the
underpinnings of a pluralistic society.8
It is questionable whether a consensus will exist in the future.
Certainly the new fiscal conservatism favours less government and
more private initiative. On the other hand, the past twenty years
has witnessed a decline in charitable contributions as a percentage
of personal expenditures on goods and services by Canadians. 9 In
that regard, one wonders whether the decline reflects the attitude
that taxes have replaced charity. Also,
public support for tax concessions may be affected by possible
changes in the nature and activities of charities. Recently, legislation
was introduced to permit charities to engage in ancillary political
activities. There has been and will continue to be increasing
pressure on Parliament to extend the tax advantages enjoyed by
charities to other groups who do not fit the traditional definition of
a charity.
II. THE CARTER REPORT
Perhaps the most significant thing to note about the sections
of the Report on charities and the charitable deduction is what they
8 This was a theme of the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs (the
Filer Commission). The Commission was established in 1973 and reported in 1975, shortly
after Watergate. It was a privately initiated (John D. Rockefeller), privately funded citizens'
panel with two broad objectives. The first one was to study the role of both philanthropic
giving in the United States, and the voluntary, 'third' sector of U.S. society. The second
objective was to make recommendations to the voluntary sector, to Congress, and to the U.S.
public at large, concerning ways in which the sector and charitable giving could be
strengthened and made more effective. See: United States, Commission on Private
Philanthropy and Public Needs, Giving in America: Toward a Stronger Voluntary Sector
(Washington: The Commission, 1975).
9A. Weiner, "Dollars to Donors" The Financial Post Moneywise Magazine (March 1987)
24 at 28. Weiner refers to a study by Robert Thompson, professor of economics at McMaster
University, analyzing donations to charity as a percentage of personal expenditures on goods
and services. See also J.F. Deeg, How and What Canadians Contribute to Charity (Toronto:
Canadian Centre for Philanthropy, 1982).
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do not deal with. In the chapter on non-profit organizationsW there
is no discussion of two of the most important issues that have arisen
in the past twenty years in the charities area: what could be called
the maximum-benefit issue,1 1 and the issue of charities' political
activities. Furthermore, in the chapter on concessionary allowances
12
there is no serious discussion of the possibility of substituting a tax
credit for the charitable deduction.
The reason for each of these omissions is different. The
Carter Commission did not address the maximum-benefit issue partly
because it evidently did not think its mandate extended to
consideration of charities' expenditures.13 A further factor may have
been the relative insignificance of the tax treatment of charities
compared with the other issues the Commission was considering: tax
rates, the unit of taxation, the tax base and corporate taxation. It
is quite probable that the political activities of charities had not
arisen as a serious problem up until the time of the Commission.
It is also likely that the Commission would have viewed its
investigation as beyond its terms of reference. As far as the
substitution of a credit for the deduction was concerned, the
Commission opined that "[i]f equity was the only consideration, we
would propose a system of tax credits for charitable donations."
14
The credit approach, however, would tend to "stifle charitable giving
by upper income taxpayers and for that reason the deduction shouldbe retained. 15 The credit-deduction debate, which was given such
lOReport, vol. 4, supra, note 1 at c. 20 "Mutual Organizations and Tax-Exempt Entities"
99.
11The proposition here is that every dollar of tax concessions to charities and contributors
to charities represents a cost to the Canadian taxpayer. Therefore the rules of taxation should
ensure that 'maximum benefit' is derived from them. Maximum benefit is, simply, pay-outs
by charities on charity in a reasonable length of time. See infra, text accompanying note 45.
12Report, vol. 3, supra, note I at 213.
131bid-, vol. 4 at 134.
1 4Ibid, vol. 3 at 222.
15lbid.
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short shrift by the Commission, will be referred to later in this
paper.1 6
The Carter Commission did make a number of
recommendations, most of which were not implemented before or at
the time of tax reform! 7  Many of the recommendations had to do
with housekeeping matters, and a few dealt with basic policy issues.
One recommendation that was adopted, albeit only partially,
was that the limit on deductible charitable donations be raised.1
The tax reform legislation raised the limit on deductible charitable
donations from 10 percent of income in a year to 20 percent of
income.19 This was more generous than the Carter recommendation,
which was for an increase to 15 percent for individuals only.
Another recommendation was that the issuance of numbered
charitable receipts be controlled by the tax authorities.2 ° In 1966,
all charities wanting to issue receipts for tax-deductible donations
were required to be registered with the Department of National
Revenue and to file annual returns.21
Among the recommendations that were not accepted, one of
the most important was that charities should pay tax at the
corporation tax rate on business income. Business income was
defined broadly to include the return on any interest of 10 percent
or more in a business.22 The main reason for the Commission's
1 6Infra, text accompanying notes 141ff.
1 7 Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148 as am. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63 [hereinafter JTA].
(This is the core legislation of the present post-Carter Commission, tax reform period.)
1 8Report, vol. 3, supra, note 1 at 235.
1 91TA, supra, note 17 at s. 110(1)(a).
2 0Report, vol. 3, supra, note 1 at 235.
2 1 lncome TaxAct, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, s. 27(3b) as am. S.C. 1966, c. 47 [hereinafter cited
as Income Tax Act], s. 3(3); Income Tax Regulations, SOR/54-682, s. 216, as am. Order in
Council P.C. 1966-2032.
22Report, vol. 4, supra, note 1 at 144.
While many charities were carrying on business at the time of the Commission, the
legislation proscribed that type of activity explicitly for charitable trusts and corporations, and
implicitly for charitable organizations. Charitable organizations were required to devote all
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recommendation was to eliminate unfair competition with the private
sector although it did advert to the "reasonableness of the retention
by charitable organizations of large amounts of their annual
revenue."
23
The 1975 reforms24  generally prohibited charities from
carrying on a business, but permitted charities other than private
foundations to carry on a related business.25 A "related business"
was defined to include "a business that is unrelated to the objects of
the charity if substantially all of the people employed by the charity
in the carrying on of that business are not remunerated for such
employment."26
The 1975 reforms also permitted charities to earn business
income from related businesses that would not be taxed. In
addition, they did not include any rules for the taxation of the non-
portfolio business income of charities.27  The legislation resulting
from the 1975 reforms did, however, continue the prohibition against
charities other than charitable organizations acquiring control of a
corporation.28
Another recommendation not reflected in legislation was that
an interdepartmental supervisory body be established to grant tax-
exempt status to charitable organizations and to review the
exemption periodically.29 It was also proposed that once a charity
their resources to charitable activities carried on by themselves. See Income Tav Act, supra,
note 21 at ss 62(1)(e), (f)(i), and (g)(i). But cf the argument regarding political activities (by
charitable organizations), infra, text accompanying note 108.
23Report, ibid at 134.
2 4The reforms were proposed in 1975 but enacted by ITA, supra, note 17 as am. S.C.
1976-77, c. 4, s. 60(1), applicable to 1977 et seq.
2 5 Ibid at ss 149.1(2)-(4).
2 61bid at s. 149.1(1)0).
2 7 The 1975 reforms also did not introduce a disbursement requirement for profits from
related businesses.
281TA, supra, note 24 at ss 149.1(3)(c), (4)(c), and (12)(a).
29Report, vol. 4, supra, note 1 at 144.
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was given approval, it be subject to periodic review by the
interdepartmental supervisory body. The body could have reasonably
been given the task of examining aspects of each charity's
operations, such as fund-raising costs and annual disbursements.
However, the Commission seemed to be more concerned about
detecting outright fraud. It suggested that every charity be required
to submit a special certificate signed by its responsible officers and
an independent auditor. The purpose of the certificate was to attest
to the existence of proper books and records maintained in a
satisfactory condition, and to constitute a minimal checking of the
accuracy of the statement of operations. A secondary purpose was
to confirm that the revenues received by a charity in a taxation year
were properly allocated between the exempt category of income
(most of a typical charity's receipts) and the non-exempt category
(business income).
There are a number of minor Commission recommendations
that have never been adopted. One was the Commission's
recommendation that the optional standard deduction be reduced to
$50 and that it apply to charitable donations only.3° Continuation
of the reduced deduction was favoured on the grounds of
administrative expediency. In 1984, the government eliminated the
optional standard deduction because "representations of voluntary
organizations have expressed concern that this deduction reduces the
tax incentive for charitable giving since the deduction is not directly
related to actual amounts given."31
Another Commission recommendation not implemented was
to continue the practice of allowing taxpayers to deduct gifts in kind
made to charities. Any such gift, however, would have been
required to have a value of more than $500.32 It is curious that the
Commission did not mention, in this context, any consideration of
provisions to reduce or eliminate the effect of the taxation of capital
gains on the disposition of tangible property to a charity.
3 01bid, vol. 3 at 235.
3 1 Canada, Department of Finance, Supplementary hifonnation to April 19, 1983 Budget
(Ottawa: Dept. of Finance, 1983).
3 2 Report, vol. 3, supra, note 1 at 236.
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Nonetheless, shortly after tax reform, legislation was introduced that
contained a provision to facilitate the transfer to charities of tangible
property that could be used by them in their charitable activities.
33
A gift of a painting to a museum would be an example. In 1986,
this provision was expanded to include gifts of all types of capital
property including intangible capital property.3 4 The significance of
this latter provision will be commented on later in this paper.
35
Finally, the Commission's assertion that "[i]t should be made
clear that charitable organizations can carry on their work inside or
outside Canada" should be mentioned.3 6 Evidently, the Department
of National Revenue was attempting to insist that the activities of
charitable organizations had to be confined to Canada. The
Commission noted affirmatively, however, the addition of a provision,
in 1966, to the Income Tax Act, that would permit taxpayers to
deduct donations to a foreign charity if the government of Canada
had made a contribution to the foreign charity in the taxpayer's
taxation year or the twelve months immediately preceding that
taxation year.37  At present there are no serious impediments to
charities carrying on their activities overseas, themselves or through
agents.3 8
331TA, supra, note 17 at s. 110(2.2) as am. S.C. 1973-74, c. 14, s. 35(7).
3 4 ITA, ibid as am. S.C. 1986, c. 6, ss 55(8)-(9).
35Infra, text accompanying note 88.
3 6 Report, vol. 4, supra, note 1 at 134.
3 7 Income TaxAct, supra, note 21 at 27(1)(a)(vi) as am. S.C. 1966-67, c. 47, s. 3(1) (now
s. u100i)a)(vii)).
3 8 See M.L. Dickson, "Gifts Involving Foreign Entities" (1986) 6:1 Philanthrop. at 48.
Also Department of Revenue Canada, Taxation, Information Circular 80-10R, Registered
Charities: Operating a Registered Charity (December, 1985) paras. 18-19.
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m. PAST REFORMS
There have been a number of so-called reforms of the tax
treatment of charities39 proposed in the last ten years. Not all of
them, however, have been implemented. There were the reforms
suggested in the 1975 Green Paper on charities,40 the proposals
introduced by the Hon. Mr. MacEachen in his 1981 budget,41 his
subsequent retreat in the press release of April 21 of the next year,
the Discussion Paper of 1983,42 and the 1984 amendments,43 which
did not, on the whole, reflect the proposals of the Discussion Paper
In addition amendments were proposed in 1985, and subsequently
enacted, to permit charities to carry on ancillary political activities.44
Thus, in the face of numerous proposals, retreats, and
counterproposals, it is difficult to discover any coherent government
policy.
In general terms, government policy over the years has been
to provide "a tax environment in which charities can thrive 45 while
ensuring that the Canadian public derives "maximum benefit" from
the tax concessions made to charities and taxpayers who contribute
to charities. Thus, in the 1975 Green Paper the government of the
3 9 Reference will also be made in the following sections to the tax treatment of charitable
donations, where relevant. During the period, there were two important changes in the
charitable donations deduction. First, for donations made in the p980 and subsequent taxation
years, the carry-forward provision of the charitable deduction in ITA, s. 110(1)(a) was
extended from one to five years. (S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 140. Second, the ITA, s. 110(2.2)
election was broadened to include intangible as well as tangible property. See infra, text
accompanying note 87.
4 0The Tax Treatment of Charities, supra, note 2.
4 1 Canada, Department of Finance, Notice of Ways and Means for the Budget of November
12, 1981 (Ottawa: Dept. of Finance, 1981).
4 2 Charities and the Canadian Tax System, supra, note 3.
4 3 1TA, supra, note 17 as am. S.C. 1984, c. 45, s. 57.
4 4 1TA, supra, note 34, s. 85(2) at ss 149.1(6) and (6.1)-(6.2).
4 5 Charities and the Canadian Tar System, supra, note 3 at iii.
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day justified its approach as follows: "Every dollar of tax relief
represents a cost to the Canadian taxpayer. The government
therefore believes that it is appropriate that the rules of taxation
ensure that the people of Canada obtain maximum benefit from the
charities."46 The government's attitude was not surprising, given that
there were over 35,000 registered charities in Canada in 1975, having
potentially tax-deductible donations together exceeding
$500,000,000!7 The number of registered charities has increased to
over 55,00048 and annual donations are estimated to exceed $2.8
billion.49
If the federal government's goal is to obtain maximum benefit
from the tax concessions to charities and contributors to charity, then
the question arises, what is maximum benefit? On examination of
the proposed reforms over the years, the answer seems to be that
funds acquired and accumulated by charities should be used for
charitable purposes within a reasonable time. The question of the
appropriate minimum pay-out over a particular period, however, has
been a matter of considerable controversy. Furthermore, the nature
of the rules necessary to implement the policy (rules dealing with
fund-raising costs, self-dealing, and anti-avoidance) have been in
dispute. On the one hand, there has been the desire for very
detailed and comprehensive rules governing the operations of
charities. On the other hand, there has been a wish for
understandable legislation that is easy to administer and to comply
with.
46The Tax Treatment of Canadian Charities, supra, note 2.
4 71bid
48Weiner, supra, note 9 at 24.
491bid at 27.
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A. From the Carter Commission to the 1975 Green Paper
In the twenty years before the 1975 Green Paper, there was
relatively little activity in the area of the tax treatment of charities 50
The main change occurred in 1966, when the registration
requirement for charities wanting to issue receipts for tax-deductible
donations was imposed.51 Otherwise, the charities provisions were
not changed much from the legislation first enacted in 1950.52
The pre-1977 legislation was exceedingly simple. All charities
were classified as either charitable organizations,53 charitable trusts,5 4
or charitable corporations 55 However, most charities (over 90
percent in 1976) were classified as charitable organizations. The
main requirement for a charitable organization was that it had to
devote all of its resources to charitable activities carried on by
itself.5 6  Since a transfer of money to another charity was not
considered to be a charitable activity carried on by the charity itself,
some charitable organizations obviously had difficulties in complying
with the rule. Different requirements applied to charitable
corporations and charitable trusts. While charitable organizations
could take varying legal forms, charitable corporations and charitable
trusts had, as their names implied, to be corporations and trusts. In
addition, charitable corporations and charitable trusts were required
to expend 90 percent of their annual income in carrying on
charitable activities or making donations to specified donees, mainly
5 0However, in 1972 the maximum charitable deduction for a year was increased from 10
percent to 20 percent of income (ITA,
s. l1O(1)(a)).
5 1 1,come Tax Regulations, supra, note 21.
5 2 R.S.C. 1950, c. 40, s. 21(1).
5 3 1TA, supra, note 17 at s. 149(1)(f) (later am. S.C. 1976-77, c. 4, s. 59(1)).
5 4 1TA, ibid at s. 149(1)(h) (rep. S.C. 1976-77, c. 4, s. 59(1)).
5 5 1bidl at s. 149(1)(g) (rep. S.C. 1976-77, c. 4, s. 59(1)).
5 6 1bid at s. 149(1)( 0 (later am. S.C. 1976-77, c. 4, s. 59(1)).
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other charities.57 Neither a charitable corporation nor a charitable
trust was permitted to carry on a business.58  They were also
prohibited from acquiring control of a corporation s9
B. The 1975 Green Paper on The Tax Treatment of Charities
The legislation enacted after the Green Paper6° was
significantly longer and more complex than the legislation it replaced.
Nonetheless, compared with some subsequent proposals, it was a
model of simplicity.
Basically, new rules were introduced to deal with three
perceived types of abuses.61 The first was in the area of fund-raising
costs. Some charities had inordinately high fund-raising costs, so that
the amounts actually given over to charitable uses were small
compared with the amounts the charities raised as contributions from
the public. Their high fund-raising costs arose for a number of
reasons, including inefficiency, bad luck, and certain non-arm's-length
transactions. Those transactions sometimes involved the payment of
high salaries to trustees or directors of the charities, or the family
and friends of the trustees or directors. Furthermore, goods and
services might be purchased from such individuals at inflated prices.
Second, some charities with substantial capital assets were
paying out comparatively little to charity under the 90-percent-of-
income rule. Most of their capital was invested in low-income-
yielding loans or securities. The 'profit', if any, arose from the
capital appreciation of their assets. Capital gains, of course, were
not included in the definition of income for the purposes of the 90
571bid at ss 149(1)(g)(iii) and (h)(iii) (rep. S.C. 1976-77, c. 4, s. 59(l)).
58Ibid at ss 149(1)(g)(iii) and (h)(iii) (rep. S.C. 1976-77, c. 4, s. 59(1)).
5 9 1bid at ss 149(1)(g)-(h) (rep. S.C. 1976-77, c. 4, s. 59(1)); and ITA s. 149(7)(a) (rep.
S.C. 1976-77, c. 4, s. 59(6)).
601TA, supra, note 24 at s. 60(1).
61 The Tax Treatment of Charities, supra, note 2 at 8-11.
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percent rule.62 The failure to pay out any significant amount to
charity was often associated with charities that lacked an
independent board of trustees or directors. The main purpose of
many such charities was not philanthropy, but to serve as estate-
planning vehicles that would facilitate the transfer of wealth between
generations without tax liability. Taxpayers could accomplish this
result relatively easily. Typically, they would establish a charity that
had trustees or directors who were under the taxpayer's effective
control. Taxpayers would then, over time, give shares in
corporations they controlled to the charity and claim tax deductions
for their donations. As a result of these gifts, the liability for tax on
death would be greatly reduced.63 Control of the corporations
would nevertheless be passed on to the family through the family's
membership on the board of the charity. Often, in addition, the
capital structure of the corporations would be so constituted that
dividends were funnelled to the family and not the charity.
The third area of significant concern was charities that were
engaged in carrying on non-taxable businesses in competition with
taxable ones.
The approach taken in the 1975 Green Paper was both simple
and reasonably effective. New categories of charities were estab-
lished, new disbursement rules introduced, and the concept of
"related business" developed. Significantly, charities were required
for the first time to file an annual public information return.64
The basic policy underlying the first two measures was that
an operating charity that mainly devotes its resources to charitable
activities carried on by itself should be subject to significantly less
control than other types of charities. It was expected that most
charities would be within this category, that is, would be charitable
organizations. The preferential treatment was accorded because "the
very nature of direct charitable activity precludes many of the abuses
621TA, supra, note 17 at s. 149(2) (later am. S.C. 1976-77, c. 4, s. 59(5)).
6 3 The tax liability arising on the taxpayer's death would be reduced, either because his
or her stock was watered down or because the taxpayer held few shares immediately before
death.
641TA, supra, note 24 at s. 149.1(14) (later am. S.C. 1984, c. 45, s. 57(16)).
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of most concern to the government."65 A charitable organization
was defined, like the old category of charitable organization, to
include charities that devote all their resources in a year to
charitable activities carried on by themselves.6 6 However, a provision
was also enacted so that a charity would be considered to be
devoting all of its resources to charitable activities carried on by
itself to the extent that, in any taxation year, it disbursed not more
than 50 percent of its income for that year to qualified donees67
(which are mainly other charities68). The only disbursement rule to
apply to charitable organizations was that a charitable organization
had to expend, in a year, an amount at least equal to 80 percent of
the total of receipts for tax-deductible donations it issued in the
preceding year on charitable activities carried on by itself and by way
of gifts made to qualified donees. 69 It was hoped that the 80
percent rule would put a cap on fund-raising costs.
The other new category of charity that was introduced was
that of the charitable foundation. The foundation category was itself
further subdivided, into public foundations and private foundations.
A public foundation was defined as a foundation where more than
50 percent of the directors or trustees deal with each other at arm's
length, and of which not more than 75 percent of the capital has
been contributed by one person or by a group of persons not
dealing at arm's length.70 A private foundation was defined as a
foundation that is not a public foundation. 71
A public foundation was required to pay out, in a year, an
amount that was the greater of 80 percent of receipted gifts for the
65 The Tar Treatment of Charities, supra, note 2 at 7.
661TA, supra, note 24 at s. 149.1(1)(b) (later am. by S.C. 1984, c. 45, ss 57(1)-(6)).
671bid at s. 149.1(6)(b).
681bid at s. 149.1(1)(h).
691bid at s. 149.1(2)(b) (later am. S.C. 1984, c. 45, s. 57(8)).
70Ibid at s. 149.1(1)(g) (later am. S.C. 1984, c. 45, ss 57(1)-(6).
71Ibi, at s. 149.1(1)(t).
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previous taxation year and 90 percent of its income for the year.72
The disbursement rules for private foundations were more stringent.
The basic rule of 90 percent of income was the same as the one for
public foundations. A special rule, however, was introduced to deal
with low-income-yielding, non-arm's-length investments. A private
foundation was required to disburse the greater of 90 percent of
income in a year from its investments, other than qualified
investments, and 5 percent of their fair market value. 73 Qualified
investments were generally defined as those investments that
deferred income plans were eligible to make.74 Hence, non-arm's-
length investments by private foundations would be caught by the 5
percent pay-out rule,75 which was the minimum disbursement in a
year that the government deemed acceptable in exchange for the tax
concessions granted to the private foundations and their contributors.
As has already been mentioned, the 1975 reforms also
prohibited charities from carrying on businesses other than related
businesses. 76
C. The 1981 MacEachen Budget: The Private Foundations
The 1981 budget of Mr. MacEachen introduced the first
major changes to the tax provisions dealing with charities since the
1975 reforms were enacted.77  The budget contained two anti-
avoidance measures designed to prevent charities from circumventing
721bid at s. 149.1(3)(b) (later am. S.C. 1984, c. 45, s. 57(9)). It is effectively 90 percent
of the previous year's income because of the reserve provisions in JTA, s. 149.1(18) (rep. S.C.
1984, c. 45, s. 57(17)).
73 1bida at 149.1(1)(e) (later am. S.C. 1984, c. 45, ss 57(1)-(6)).
741bid at s. 149.1(1)(i) (rep. S.C. 1984, c. 45, ss 57(1)-(6)).
7 5 It is noteworthy that the 80-percent-of-receipted-donations rule did not apply to private
foundations, presumably because they were not expected to have fund-raising costs.
7 6 See hifra, text accompanying note 149.
77Legislation was introduced in 1976 and was generally applicable for 1977 et seq.
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the disbursement rules. 78  It also included two proposals that
reflected a fundamental change in government policy pertaining to
the disbursement requirements of charitable foundations. The first
proposal related only to private foundations. It provided that the
minimum pay-out requirement of private foundations in respect of
non-qualified investments be raised from 5 percent of their fair
market value to 10 percent.79 The second proposal related to both
private and public foundations. Taxable capital gains were to be
included, for the first time, in the calculation of income for the
purposes of the 90 percent disbursement requirement.
80
The combined effect of the proposed changes on private
foundations would have been profound. The operation of the 10
percent pay-out rule and the changed 90-percent-of-income rule
would undoubtedly have undermined the long-term viability of many
private foundations81 The provisions would have effectively limited
the 'lifetimes' of many private foundations with non-arm's-length
investments to about forty years. The result possibly could have
been a reduction in charitable donations by those individuals who,
before the changes, would have established and contributed to
private foundations.8 2
78Supra, note 43 at ss 138(a)-(b).
79 1bid at s. 138(d).
801bid at s. 139(b).
8 1 See C.A. Bond, "Income Taxation of Charities: The 1983 Discussion Paper and Draft
Legislation - Implications for Charitable Foundations" in Proceedings of the 35th Tax
Conference - 1983 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1984) 386.
82But see Subcommittee on Oversight of the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House
of Representatives, Report and Recommendations concerning Federal Tax Rules Governing
Private Foundations (Washington: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1983) at 43-45; and ibid,
Development of the Law and Continuing Legal Issues in tire Tax Treatment of Private
Foundations (Washington: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1983) at 54-55. The Tar Reform Act
of 1969 introduced strict rules dealing with the U.S. equivalent to Canadian private
foundations. It was found that U.S. private foundations continued to increase in number and
financial strength, but the rate of growth in numbers was substantially less than the rate for
the ten-year period preceding the Act. The U.S. pay-out requirement under the 1969
amendments was the higher of the minimum investment return and net investment income.
The minimum return rate was 6 percent of assets of 1970 and adjusted by Treasury to reflect
changes in money rates and investment yields.
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The proposed changes met with general hostility from the
foundations and their representatives. On the one hand, the
benefits that had been derived by some taxpayers from the
establishment of private foundations with substantial subsidies from
the fisc were considerable. The estate-planning advantages have
already been mentioned. It was also possible to control the
operations and orientation of the foundation during the taxpayer's
lifetime - as a kind of incorporated, tax-sheltered chequebook.
Finally, the combined control of the taxpayer's businesses and his or
her foundation raised the possibility of transactions more
advantageous to the taxpayer and the taxpayer's business interests
than to charity. The new pay-out requirement would have limited
the estate-planning possibilities and potential conflicts of interest.
Also, the public's contribution (in the form of tax concessions) to
the taxpayer's private charity would, along with his or her own funds,
be disbursed promptly. On the other hand, the long-term programs
of private foundations would be jeopardized.
The proposals in the 12 November 1981 budget possibly also
reflected the view that private foundations were not as worthy of
government support as other types of charities. This belief is based
on the fact that private foundations are generally elite institutions
that lack the legitimacy of other types of charities because they are
not funded or controlled by the public at large. However, this view
ignores the reality that philanthropy as a whole is neither funded by
nor controlled by the public at large.83 Furthermore, even when a
charity has wide financial support it is not necessarily controlled by
the public or the community or some group representing a
majoritarian viewpoint. In any case, it is not clear that the public
interest is better served by charities governed by committee or
8 3 Pcople who run charities are generally of a higher socio-economic status than the
people who receive the charities' largess. See also Deeg, supra, note 9. A national sample
survey on giving behaviour and attitudes was conducted for the Filer Commission by the
Survey Research Centre of the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan.
It found, among other things, that 21 percent of money contributions by individuals was
projected to come from those with incomes of $50,000 or more.
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susceptible to public opinion. 'Private' charity, it has often been
argued, has the potential, sometimes demonstrated, more often not,
to develop creative and innovative solutions to society's problems.
84
The attitude that private foundations lack the legitimacy of
other charities8 S may be the rationale for a number of provisions in
the United States Internal Revenue Code that treat private
foundations differently and less generously than other charities.8 6 In
Canada, government has been, except for the November 1981
budget, more favourable to private foundations. The 1976 reforms
were the minimum possible in the light of the abuses. The 1981
proposal of a 10 percent pay-out for non-arm's-length investments
was subsequently withdrawn and effectively replaced with a lower
prescribed rate. Moreover, in 1986, the Income Tax Act was
amended to permit a special election in respect of all capital
property contributed to a charity, including intangibles such as the
shares of a corporation.87 This change is particularly significant for
taxpayers who want to establish private foundations that will hold
their businesses. Formerly, the election was allowed only in respect
of tangible capital property that could reasonably be regarded as
being suitable for use by the charity directly in carrying on its
charitable activities.88 The election permits the donor to elect
84The comments of the Peterson Committee (The Commission on Foundations and
Private Philanthropy were as follows: "While the public rhetoric of foundations stresses
continuing bold, venturesome leaps into the future, a more complete picture would include
a rather pervasive passivity, and sluggishness that marks not only their financial investments
and pay-out to charity but also the quality of grant making of most American foundations."
Foundations, Private Giving Public Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970) at 119.
8 5But cf B.I. Bittker, "Should Foundations be Third-Class Charities?" The Future of
Foundations, F.F. Heimann, ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1973).
8 6Thus, for example, the limit on the percentage of income that can be donated in a year
to a charity is lower for private foundations than for other types of charities. The rules for
donations of appreciated property are somewhat less generous for donations to private
foundations. There is a special excise tax of 2 percent on the investment income of private
foundations. Private foundations are not permitted to own more than 20 percent of the shares
of a corporation. Like Canadian private foundations, there are special pay-out rules and rules
with respect to self-dealing.
8 71TA, supra, note 34 at s. 110(2.2).
8 81TA, supra, note 33 at s. 110(2.2).
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between the property's fair market value and its adjusted cost base
to determine the proceeds of disposition and the amount of the
donor's gift. The advantage of the election is that it permits the
taxpayer to obtain the highest amount possible as a charitable
donation consistent with the income limitation rule, while realizing
the minimum possible capital gains.
D. The 21 April 1982 Press Release: Reconsideration
The hostile reaction to the charities proposals in the 1981
budget caused the government to reconsider its position. After
consultation with representatives of the foundations, the Minister of
Finance issued a press release on 21 April 1982, in which he
outlined a new set of proposals. The most important changes, which
represented considerable back-pedalling by the Department of
Finance, concerned the minimum disbursement rules. Fast, the
existing disbursement rules for both private and public foundations
were replaced with a minimum disbursement quota of 4.5 percent of
the market value of all investment assets. This eliminated two
'problems'. Foundations with greatly appreciated assets would not
be faced, on their realization, with a massive pay-out requirement.
In addition, it would no longer be necessary for foundations to
attempt to calculate their income. The business concept of income
had not translated particularly well to the charitable sector, often
making the calculation of income for the purposes of the
disbursement rules uncertain. On the other hand, the reduction in
the disbursement requirements was a significant deviation from the
policy of requiring a faster pay-out by foundations.
The second major change in the disbursement rules was an
indirect one. In lieu of the 10 percent disbursement requirement for
private foundations, a rule was introduced that the non-qualified
investments of private foundations had to earn a minimum rate of
return, related to the prescribed rate. If the minimum rate of return
was not earned, a penalty was exacted, not on the foundation, but
on the benefiting person. This approach was preferable to the all-
or-nothing approach of the previous legislation, in which non-
compliance with the disbursement rules resulted in deregistration of
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the charity and a 100 percent tax on the charity's assets.89
Furthermore, the new rule penalized the person who profited,90 and
not the potential donees of the charity.
In October 1982, the new Minister of Finance, Marc
Lalonde, announced a delay in the implementation of the new
proposals in order to give his officials time to examine the possibility
of applying the same rules to both charitable foundations and
charitable organizations. In May of the next year, he released the
1983 Discussion Paper on charities.
E. The 1983 Discussion Paper: Plugging the Loopholes
The epithet for the 1983 Discussion Paper could be Winston
Churchill's admonition to the British Parliament: "We must beware
of needless innovation, especially when guided by logic." The
amazing thing about the 1983 Discussion Paper was that it proposed
complex legislation relating to the charitable sector at about the
same time that the government made a public commitment to the
simplification of the tax provisions relating to small business.91 The
complexity arose mainly from the proposed anti-avoidance rules; the
disbursement rules; and the application of those rules to all charities,
whether they were charitable organizations or charitable foundations.
The anti-avoidance rules were designed to prevent charities
from circumventing the disbursement rules by transferring funds to
related charities. The main problem was with the definition of
related charities. 92 Charities were deemed to be related if they had
a major donor in common or if one charity was the major donor of
891TA, supra, note 24 at ss 149.1(2)(b), (3)(b) (later am. S.C. 1984, c. 45, ss 57(8)-(9)),
and 149.1(4)(b).
9 0 The person who profited would be the corporation whose shares the charity held, or
the person to whom it lent funds.
9 1 Most of the major simplifying changes to the small business provisions were enacted
by ITA, supra, note 43 at s. 40.
92The proposed legislation is found in Charities and die Canadian Tax System, supra, note
3 at 23-34 [hereinafter PL].
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the other. A major donor was defined to include any person or
group who contributed to a charity specified gifts93 that constituted
more than 10 percent of all gifts received by the charity after 31
December 1982 and before receipt of the gift.94
In order for two charities to determine whether they were
related, they would have to analyze and compare their record of
contributors. Moreover, they would have to keep running totals of
the specified gifts made not only by individuals, but also by various
combinations of related individuals. The difficulties would include,
for example, the possibility of siblings and spouses having different
surnames, and the wish of some donors to remain anonymous. Even
if the charities could get over the initial hurdle, the Minister of
National Revenue was given considerable discretion to direct that
charities be considered related.95 To sum up, the rules represented
an unrealistic expectation of the financial and technical sophistication
of many charities.
The disbursement rules were also complex. Part of the
complexity arose because of the inevitable transitional rules,96 which
accompany every major change in legislation. One rule in particular,
however, dealing with loans made and received by charities,
potentially raised a lot of compliance problems.97 It required that
charities operate in exactly the opposite way from how they had
under the previous legislation. Under the previous legislation, there
was no disbursement requirement for any loan a charity received.
As a corollary, a loan made by a charity did not count toward the
fulfilment of its disbursement quota. The new legislation would
have required loans received to be treated as gifts (income) and
loans made to be treated as charitable disbursements.
93A specified gift was defined as a gift with a fair market value at the time of its
donation of not less than $1,000. PL, ibid at s. 149.1(1)(g).
9 41bid. at s. 149.1(1)(b).
951bidat ss 149.1(4)(5).
9 61bid at s. 188(1)(b)(v)
9 71bid at ss 188(1)(v)(ii) and (d)(iii).
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The problem of the complexity of the rules was exacerbated
because they applied not only to foundations but also to charitable
organizations. Even more than the foundations, the charitable
organizations (especially the smaller ones) did not have the resources
to comply with the new rules.
The proposed legislation in the 1983 Discussion Paper
provoked another outcry from the charitable sector. This time the
complaints came mainly from charitable organizations, rather than
the foundations. In the end, the government's response was not to
enact most of the complex rules proposed in the Discussion Paper.
Instead, proposals were introduced in the Minister of Finance's
Economic Statement of 8 November 1984, to make more limited
changes in the charities legislation.
F. The Economic Statement of 8 November 1984: Retrenchment
The legislation introduced in 1984 made a number of
important changes to the 1975 reform legislation. The legislation
had two aspects. First, it incorporated the proposals announced in
the 8 April 1982 press release, which represented a withdrawal from
the tougher disbursement rules contained in the 12 November 1981
budget. Hence, the general disbursement requirement for
foundations was reduced from 5.5 percent to 4.5 percent.98  In
addition, the 90-percent-of-income rule was dropped. Finally, a rule
was introduced to provide that where the non-qualified investments
of a private foundation do not earn a prescribed minimum rate of
return, not the charity, but the person who profited (that is, the
borrower or corporation whose shares the foundation holds) is
subject to a 100 percent tax on the shortfall.99
The second aspect of the 8 November legislation was the
introduction of new anti-avoidance rules. The rules were quite
simple and generally limited to foundations. Basically, they provided
98The minimum rate was not actually 5 percent since the formula was the lesser of 5
percent of the fair market value of the assets and 90 percent of income; that is, 5.5 percent.
9 91TA, supra, note 43, s. 78 at s. 189. [Ed: Section 78 is the amending section; s. 189
is the JTA section referred to.]
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that at least 80 percent (or 100 percent, in the case of a private
foundation) of gifts received by a foundation from other charities
must be paid out in its next taxation year.100 In addition, a special
tax of 25 percent was imposed on a foundation that transfers more
than 50 percent of its capital to a charitable organization for the
purpose of reducing or postponing its disbursement requirements 0 1
Although not necessarily an anti-avoidance rule, the new
requirement that charitable organizations have an independent board
of directors10 2 obviously is helpful in limiting abuses.
The third aspect of the 8 November legislation was the
preservation of the distinctions between charitable organizations and
charitable foundations. The disbursement requirement of charitable
organizations was to remain at 80 percent of receipted donations.103
G. Charities and Political Activities
In 1985, legislation was introduced to permit registered
charities to engage in political activities in certain circumstances. A
registered charity is permitted to devote resources to political
activities if, in the case of charitable organization, it devotes
substantially all its resources to charitable activities carried on by
itself or, in the case of a charitable foundation, it devotes
substantially all its resources to charitable purposes. In addition, the
political activities must be ancillay and incidental to its charitable
activities or purposes.104 The resources that may be expended on
political activities are limited, because expenditures on political
'
0 0 1bid s. 57 at ss 149.1(1)(e)(ii)-(iii).
1 0 1 1bid2, s. 78 at s. 188(3).
1021bid, s. 57 at s. 149.1(1)(b)(iii) (more than 50 percent of the directors or trustees deal
at arm's length).
1031t was proposed in the Discussion Paper that the pay-out for all charities be 80 percent
of all gifts. PL, supra, note 92, s. 188(1)(b)(iii). This would have left the smaller charitable
organizations without much manoeuvring room.
1041TA, supra, note 34, s. 85(2) at ss 149.1(6.1)-(6.2).
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activities cannot be counted towards the fulfilment of a charity's
disbursement requirements.105
It is a moot point whether, in fact, the legislation was even
necessary. Under the common law, a charitable purpose can include
ancillary and incidental political objects.106 On the other hand, the
tax provisions dealing with charities required that a charitable
organization devote all its resources to charitable activities107 and
that a charitable foundation be constituted and operated exclusively
for charitable purposes1 08 On a fair and liberal interpretation of
the provisions, it is arguable that resources devoted to ancillary and
incidental political activities are in fact resources devoted to the
charity's activities or purposes.
Whatever the merits of the argument, it has been Revenue
Canada's position since at least 1978 (and probably earlier) that,
until the amendment, the Income Tax Act prohibited charities from
engaging in any political activities. The significance of 1978 is that
Revenue Canada issued Information Circular 78-3, which
promulgated its view in that year' °9 The public's response, however,
was sufficiently adverse that the Department had to withdraw the
circular. Nonetheless, no change was forthcoming in Revenue
Canada's administration of the income tax provisions. Subsequently,
in 1980, it refused to register a charity on the basis that it had a
political rather than a charitable purpose, and in 1981 it attempted
1 051bid, s. 85(1) at s. 149.1(1.1)(b).
1 0 6 L.A. Sheridan, "Charitable Causes, Political Causes and Involvement" (1980) 2:4
Philanthrop. at 5.
1 071TA, supra, note 24 at s. 149.1(1)(b) (later am. S.C. 1984, c. 45, ss 57(1)-(6)). The
same formulation is currently found in s. 149.1(1)(b)(i) but it is modified by ITA s. 149.1(6.2).
1 0 8 1TA, ibid. at 149.1(1)(a). Currently s. 149.1(1)(a) is modified by ITA s. 149.1(6.1).
109Canada, Department of National Revenue, Taxation, Infonnation Circular No. 78-3,
Registered Charities: Political Objects and Activities (February 27, 1978). Some very limited
political activities were permitted. They included presenting briefs with recommendations to
appropriate government bodies, whether or not solicited (provided they were not part of a
campaign to influence legislation), and making representations to elected representatives or
government officials. However, lobbying, public demonstrations, and writing letters to editors
of newspapers that air political views or attempt to sway public opinion on a 'political' issue
were prohibited.
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to revoke the registration of a charity on the ground that it engaged
in political activities.
The first case involved the Department's refusal to register
the Manitoba Foundation for Canadian Studies as a charity. The
main object of the foundation was to publish Canadian Dimension.
The magazine specialized in economic issues, and its approach could
be characterized as left of centre. Revenue Canada's position was
that the magazine's main goal was not to educate, but to promote
a particular ideology.110
The second case involved the deregistration of Renaissance
International, an Ontario-based evangelical organization.
Renaissance had purchased two full-page advertisements in a
newspaper urging voters to elect a "moral majority" in the federal
election. The advertisements also asked readers to express their
concern about pro-homosexual candidates in the Toronto civic race.
In addition, Renaissance groups across the country apparently
prepared and publicized moral report cards on candidates in
elections.111 Ultimately, the case was argued before the Federal
Court, not on the basis of whether the activities were permissible,
but on a denial of natural justice by Revenue Canada. 112
At least one commentator 13 has suggested that the actions
of Revenue Canada in the Renaissance case and in the Canadian
Dimension case did not provoke nearly the outcry from the general
public as did its publication of the 1978 information circular.
Perhaps the reality of taxpayer-subsidized charities engaging in
controversial activities was less palatable, and the need for limits
more obvious.
In any case, as already indicated, legislation was introduced
in 1985 to permit charities to engage in limited political activities.
In evaluated the legislation, two things have to be kept in mind.
1100. Pitts, "Charities fight for right to lobby," The Financial Post (16 May 1981) 1.
1 1 1 NA Drache, "Revenues arbitrary rulings get whacked by court" The Financial Post
(4 December 1982) 1.
1 1 2 Renaissance hItenzational v. MNR, [1982] C.T.C. 393 (F.C.A.).
113N. Brooks, Charities: the Legal Framework (Ottawa: Secretary of State, 1983).
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First, the problem of charities engaging in political activities is
intractable, perhaps unsolvable. It is arguable that all acts or failures
to act are political acts, and that it is impossible to separate morals
and politics. Second, the problem of charities engaging in political
activities may be more theoretical than practical. Registered
charities have the option of circumventing limitations on their
political activities simply by incorporating non-charitable entities to
carry on their political activities for them.11 4
Before considering the policy underlying the 1985 legislation,
mention should be made of possible constitutional impediments. It
is possible, if not probable, that the limitations on political activities
incorporated in the Income Tax Act will be challenged successfully
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.115 The basis
would be either the freedom of speech provision in section 2 of the
equality rights provision in section 15. A U.S. case, Taxation with
Representation of Washington v. United States116 provides some
indication of the arguments that might be made under the Charter.
In Taxation with Representation of Washington (TRW) a suit
was brought by a non-profit organization seeking a declaratory
judgment that it qualified for tax-exempt status under section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Section 501(c)(3)
grants tax exemption to certain non-profit organizations, "no
substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda,
or otherwise attempting to influence legislation." Another section of
the Code, 170(c)(2), permits taxpayers who contribute to section
501(c)(3) organizations to deduct the amount of their contributions
on their federal income tax. TRW, which was organized to promote
its view of the public interest in the area of taxation, had been
denied registration as a section 501(c)(3) organization because it
appeared that a substantial part of its activities would consist of
attempting to influence legislation.
1 1 4 This might be difficult for some charities, such as religious organizations.
1 1 5 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
116(1983), 103 S. Ct. 1997.
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TRw claimed the prohibition against substantial lobbying was
unconstitutional on two grounds. First, it violated the First
Amendment (freedom of speech) because it imposed an
"unconstitutional burden" on the recipient of tax-deductible
contributions. Second, the prohibition was unconstitutional under
the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment due
process clause because the Code permitted tax-deductible
contributions to veterans' organizations, which are permitted to lobby
the government.
The Supreme Court of the United States, all concurring, held
that the prohibition was constitutional. The opinion of the Court
was delivered by Mr. Justice Rehnquist who said:
TWR is certainly correct when it states that we have held that the government may
not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right [freedom
of speech].... But TWIR is just as certainly incorrect when it claims that this case
fits the Speiser-Peny model. The Code does not deny TWR the right to receive
deductible contributions to support its non-lobbying activity, nor does it deny TWR
any independent benefit on account of its intention to lobby. Congress has merely
refused to pay for the lobbying out of public moneys.1 1 7
Mr. Justice Rehnquist also stated that there was no infringement of
Fifth Amendment rights. He indicated that the distinction drawn
between section 501(c)(3) organizations and veterans' organizations
was valid since it bore "a rational relationship to a legitimate
governmental purpose."11 8  He also noted that "legislatures have
especially broad latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in
tax statutes.
119
A Charter challenge to the limitations on the political
activities of charities based on freedom of speech is likely to
reproduce the First Amendment arguments used by TRW. On the
other hand, the arguments advanced by TRW in respect of its Fifth
Amendment rights do not necessarily transfer well or, indeed, at all
to the Canadian Charter. First, the Canadian equality rights
provision is worded differently than the U.S. one. Section 15 of the
1 1 7 1bid at 2001 [emphasis added].
1181bid
1 1 9 1bid at 2002.
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Charter provides equality rights to individuals.12 ° Hence, it may be
that charities, whether trusts, corporations, or unincorporated
organizations, are not covered by section 15. It may be possible,
however, to formulate an equality rights argument for the
contributors to a charity, rather than the charity itself. Second, even
assuming the individual limitation is surmountable, there really is no
organization comparable to charities, such as the U.S. veterans'
organizations, under Canadian tax legislation. Thus, an equality
rights argument might have to rest on comparison of charities and,
for example, corporations. To the extent that the comparison is not
between very similar entities, it can be expected that it will be easier
for the fisc to argue that the difference in tax treatment is well
founded.
Constitutional considerations aside, there are a number of
good reasons why charities should be able to carry on whatever
political activities they want. The nomenclature at this point,
however, becomes confusing because if charities are permitted to
carry on unlimited political activities, they cease to be charities under
the common law. Hence, the real issue is whether the tax
concessions that are now extended to charities should be extended
to other non-profit organizations in the voluntary sector.
Certainly, the years since World War II have witnessed in
Canada some fundamental changes in the voluntary sector. In the
first place, the care of the needy and the ill, which was once the
primary focus of private charity, is now largely handled by
government.1 21 New issues have assumed prominence, such as the
environment and native and women's rights. Increasingly, volunteer
organizations see one of their important roles to be government
watchdogs and advocates of social and legislative reform. They view
themselves as important participants in the modelling of a pluralistic
Canadian society. Even the traditional charities dealing with, for
example, the problems of poverty, imprisonment, and the aged, are
taking on a more political role based on their understanding that
real solutions are fundamentally political.
1 2 0 Charter, supra, note 115.
121S.A. Martin, Financing Hunianistic Service (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975)
at 23ff.
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Many of the justifications for the special tax status of
charities can also be made for these new-style charities and voluntary
organizations. Most important, they are a counterbalance to the
government. In addition, they sometimes assume a similar role vis-
a-vis business. Tax concessions to such organizations may then offset
the ability of business to write off the costs of many of their political
activities as a cost of carrying on business.1
22
On the other hand, there are some compelling reasons for
restricting the ability to issue receipts for tax-deductible contributions
to charities that carry on only limited political activities. First, the
traditional justification for tax concessions to charities - that they do
things that otherwise the government would have to do - does not
apply to non-profit organizations whose primary thrust is political.
Second, there is unlikely to be the same societal consensus in favour
of extending the concession to other non-profit organizations that
are essentially political in nature. The public may support tax
concessions for the old-style, generally non-controversial charities.
They are not likely, however, to support tax concessions for charities
that may be involved in political activities perceived to be
threatening, divisive, and destabilizing. Of course, even within the
limits laid down in the 1985 legislation, there is the risk of alienating
the public.
If the policy of permitting charities to engage in limited
political activities is an appropriate compromise between those who
would have them carry on no political activities and those who would
permit unlimited activities, the execution of the policy in the
legislation is flawed. First, if one assumes that charities should be
able to carry on limited political activities, then the present system
of permitting charities to use only those resources left after they
fulfil their disbursement requirements is unfair. Charitable
organizations will be at a disadvantage because they are the charities
least likely to have funds in reserve. Charitable organizations are
also the charities that are 'in the field' and to whom it is arguably
most important to give a political voice. A system similar to the one
in the United States might be better. The legislation could provide,
1220On the other hand, perhaps a better equilibrium would be achieved by limiting the
ability of business to write off political expenses.
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for example, for a charity to be permitted to expend on a percentage
(on a sliding scale) of the amount it disbursed on charity in the year
on political activities.123  One problem with the sliding scale,
however, is that provisions would have to introduced to prevent
charities from splitting into two or more units in order to increase
their allowable expenditures on political activities.
A second criticism of the execution of the policy is not with
the legislation, but with Revenue Canada's interpretation of the
requirement that the charity has to devote "substantially all" of its
resources to charitable activities carried on by itself, or to charitable
purposes. Revenue Canada's position as stated in Infornation
Circular 87-1 is that "substantially all" means 90 percent or more.
A preferable approach is the one adopted by the u.s. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Christian Echoes National Minisy,
Inc. v. United States.124 In that case, the court explicitly rejected a
percentage test in determining "substantially", as obscuring the
"complexity of balancing the organization's activities in relation to its
objectives and circumstances." It further stated: "The political (that
is, legislative) activities of an organization must be balanced in the
context of the objectives and circumstances of the organization to
determine whether a substantial part of its activities was to influence
or attempt to influence legislation."1 25
A final criticism of the 1984 amendments is that no
distinction is made between permissible political activities of private
foundations, and those of charitable organizations and public
foundations. In the United States, private foundations cannot
engage in most political activities without penalties. It is arguable
that the same position should obtain in Canada. The concern here
123In the United States a charity is allowed to expend 20 percent of the first $500,000
of its expenditures for an exempt purpose, plus 15 percent of the next $500,000 on "legislative
lobbying", 10 percent of the next $500,000, and 5 percent of any remaining expenditures.
However, the total amount spent for legislative activities in any one year by a charity may not
exceed $1,000,000. A further amount, namely one-fourth of the foregoing amounts, may be
expended by a charity on attempts to influence the general public on legislative matters
(grassroots lobbying).
124(1972), 470 F.2d 849.
125Ibid at 855.
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is that a private foundation could become a vehicle for the
expression and dissemination of the political views of a particular
individual or family. The individual or family would therefore enjoy
a direct benefit, as a result of their philanthropic activities, that is
contrary to the spirit of the regime of tax concessions granted to
them. If private foundations are permitted to carry on political
activities, there may also be adverse social and political implications.
IV. PRESENT PROBLEMS
Part III indicated a number of problem areas in which the
government has attempted, and sometimes succeeded in making,
reforms. This paper has already indicated several areas that may
ultimately merit further consideration. The new disbursement rules,
especially for private foundations, may not generate large enough
pay-outs to justify the tax concessions and other advantages given to
them and their contributors. It is not yet clear whether the new
anti-avoidance rules will accomplish their purpose. The right balance
may or may not have been struck by the new rules on the political
activities of charities. Indeed, suggestions on how the political
activities provisions might be improved have been given.
Nevertheless, it would seem appropriate that, for the time being, the
charities area be left alone in order to see how the legislation works
in practice.
Reforms aside, there are four areas that probably deserve
separate consideration as present issues, if not as present problems.
The first issue is, of course, the new lower tax rates that will be
proposed in the Hon. Mr. Michael Wilson's tax reform. Lowered
tax rates will inevitably reduce the incentive to taxpayers to make
charitable donations. It is not clear what response, if any, the
government will have. The other issues or problems are the
definition of charity, the choice between tax deductions and tax
credits, and the scope of the related business provisions. These
issues are worth considering because recent history has not ruled out
possible changes.
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A. The Definition of Charity
The Income Tax Act defines a "charity" as a "charitable
organization" or a "charitable foundation. 126  A charitable
organization is defined as an organization carrying on "charitable
activities", 127 and a charitable foundation is defined as a corporation
or trust carrying on "charitable purposes. 128 No meaning, however,
is given in the Act to charitable activities or purposes. Thus,
ultimately, the definition in the Act of the term charity depends on
the common law.
There are countless cases in the United Kingdom and
Canada that deal with the question of what is a charity or a
charitable purpose.129 The leading case on the meaning of charity
is Commissioners for Special Puiposes of Income Tax v. Pemsel. 30
In that case, Lord Macnaughten, who wrote the leading majority
opinion, said: "'Charity' in its legal sense comprises four principal
divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement
of education; trusts for advancement of religion; and trusts for other
purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under any of the
preceding heads."131 Generally speaking, for a purpose to be found
to be charitable, it must be within one of the four categories listed
1 2 61TA, supra, note 17 at s. 149.1(1)(d).
12 71bid. at s. 149.1(1)(b)(i).
12 8Ibid at s. 149.1(1)(a).
12 90nly a handful, however, deal with the meaning of charity for tax purposes. In most
of the cases the issue is whether a trust (often established by a will) is for a charitable
purpose. If it is, the trust will be valid even if its terms violate the rule against perpetuities
or are uncertain. If it is not, the next of kin of the testator may have grounds to attack the
will.
130[1891] A.C. 531.
1 3 1 1bid at 583.
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by Lord Macnaughten 32  The purpose must also be for the public
benefit. Public benefit means that the purpose must fulfil some
social interest, and the 'public' or some significant subcommunity, not
a small number of persons, must be served.133 In addition, the
purpose cannot be against public policy. This includes, for example,
a substantial political element1 34 or connection with non-charitable
purposes such as personal profit-making. Finally, the purpose should
be within the "spirit and intendment" of the preamble to An Act to
redress the Mis-employment of Lands, Goods and Stocks of Money
heretofore given to certain charitable Uses.135
Two questions arise from the common law meaning of
charity. The first is: should the meaning of charity be expanded or
contracted for the purposes of determining eligibility for the tax
132 But see Scottish Burial Refomi and Cremation Society v. Glasgow Corporation (1967),
[1968] A.C. 138 at 154, [1967] 3 All E.R. 215 at 223, in which Lord Wilberforce said:
But three things may be said about it, which its author would surely not have
denied: first that, since it is a classification of convenience, there may well be
purposes which do not fit neatly into one or the other of the headings; second, that
the words used must not be given the force of a statute to be construed; and
thirdly, that the law of charity is a moving subject which may well have evolved even
since 1891.
1 3 3 1f the purpose is to be found within the first three of Macnaughton's categories, the
presumption is that the purpose is for the public benefit. If the purpose is within the fourth
category, the burden generally falls on the proponent to prove the purpose is for the public
benefit. This analysis was presented in considerable detail in Brooks, supra, note 113.
1 3 4 Sheridan, supra, note 106.
135(U.K.) 43 Eliz., c. 4; Morice v. Bishop of Durham (1805), 10 Ves. Jun. 522, 32 E.R.
947.
The statute is long since repealed but its list of charitable purposes is still referred to.
It included:
the relief of aged, impotent and poor people;
the maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers and mariners;
the maintenance of schools of learning, free schools and scholars in universities;
the repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, sea-banks and highways;
the education and preferment of orphans;
the relief, stock or maintenance of houses of correction;
the marriage of poor maids;
the supportation, aid and help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen, and persons decayed;
the relief and redemption of prisoners or captives;
the aid or ease of any poor inhabitants concerning payment of fifteens, setting out of
soldiers and other taxes.
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concessions under the Income Tax Act? The second question is:
how should that meaning be expressed?
In answering the first question one has to be against
extending the definition of charity, in any major way, if one thinks
tax concessions for charities are tax expenditures.1 36  In that view
the charitable exemption from tax and the tax deduction are not
technical tax provisions designed to assist in the calculation of a
taxpayer's taxable income. Rather, they are measures designed to
achieve a specific social goal that could be achieved by other
methods, such as direct grants. In general, alternative methods of
delivering subsidies are to be preferred to tax expenditures.1 37
Nonetheless, as suggested at the beginning of this paper, the
tax concessions to charities appear to rest on societal consensus.
Therefore, despite the almost total lack of control by the
government of the disposition of large amounts of public funds and
the upside-down nature of the subsidy (in respect of the charitable
deduction), the charitable deduction or some variation is likely to be
retained for the foreseeable future. On the other hand, there is
little reason to extend the concessions to activities not now classified
as charitable, although other forms of assistance may be
appropriate.13 8 The one exception, perhaps, would be some kind of
tax deduction or credit for public interest groups, precisely because,
among other things, absence of government control is a desirable
characteristic of such a. subsidy.13 9
13 6But cf supra, text at 1.
1 3 7 See S.S. Surrey, Pathways to Tar Refonn: Tire Concept of Tax Expenditures
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973).
1 3 8 A typical example of the pressure on governments is the recommendation of the
recent task force on the funding of the arts to include registered Canadian arts organizations
as eligible recipients of tax-deductible charitable donations. The organizations do not quality
at present for charitable status because they provide a variety of services not to the public but
to their constituencies, which are within the artistic community. Task Force on Funding of
the Arts in Canada, Funding of tire Arts in Canada to the Year 2000 (Ottawa: Minister of
Supply and Services, 1986) at 101. But cf. the deduction for registered Canadian amateur
athletic associations in ITA, supra, note 17 at s. 110(1)(a)(ii).
1 3 9 The issue of funding public interest groups is beyond the ambit of this paper. See,
however, KG. Englehart & MJ. Trebilcock, Public Participation in the Regulatory Process: Tire
Issue of Funding, Working Paper No. 17 (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1981).
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A more extreme position is that the definition should be
narrowed. The argument is that government has limited resources
and that it is up to it as the elected representative of the people
to allocate these resources according to some plan of priorities. To
the extent that charities do what government would otherwise have
to do, tax concessions to them can be justified. Otherwise, their
activities, however estimable, should not be subsidized through the
tax system.
The second question is: assuming the present core meaning
of charity is retained, how should it be expressed? A number of
bodies in England have seriously considered the problem of setting
out a comprehensive and comprehensible detailed definition of
charity.' 40 The idea is that a detailed definition will be more
understandable to non-lawyers than the subtle distinctions made in
a myriad of sometimes conflicting cases under the common law.
On the other hand, it is not at all clear that the charities
sector in Canada is clamouring for a change. A detailed definition
is likely to be more inflexible and less susceptible to incremental
change than the common law (which is desirable at the margins).
In addition, a new definition would probably make a great deal of
the previous case law obsolete. The law might, therefore, become
less predictable. Finally, it is not at all certain that the 'hard cases'
would be any easier to determine under detailed legislation than
under the common law.
B. Tax Deduction versus Tax Credit
The Carter Commission's discussion of the deduction for
charitable donations left much to be desired. It dismissed the idea
of substituting a credit for the deduction in two sentences. The
government response to the Commission's Report, the White Paper
on tax reform, did not mention charities, let alone the specifics of
the charitable donation. Subsequently, during the various reforms in
the charities area, no government publicly acknowledged the tax
140The various English reviews of the definition of charity are detailed by Brooks, supra,
note 113.
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deduction versus tax credit debate. However, the Minister of
Finance, Mr. Wilson, has suggested that one aspect of his proposed
tax reform will be to substitute tax credits for certain tax exemptions
and deductions.
The Carter Commission referred to, but did not discuss, two
key features of the tax deduction-tax credit debate. They are the
equity argument, and the problem of upper-income contributors to
charity. The Commission said that if equity was the only
consideration then it would recommend the substitution of a tax
credit for a tax deduction.141 It can be assumed that by "equity" the
Commission meant the proposition that a charitable donation should
be worth the same to all taxpayers whatever their marginal rates of
tax. Under the present system of a charitable deduction, a
charitable donation is worth more to a higher-income taxpayer than
to a lower-income taxpayer. Thus, for example, if a taxpayer at a 50
percent marginal rate makes a $100 donation to charity, the donation
is worth $50. On the other hand, if the taxpayer is at a 20 percent
marginal rate, the $100 donation is worth only $20. If, perchance,
the taxpayer is unfortunate enough to have no taxable income, the
$100 donation is worth nothing. In other words, the cost of the
$100 charitable donation to the three taxpayers is, respectively $50,
$80, and $100. Therefore, the cost of the charitable donation is the
greatest to the taxpayer who presumably can least afford it.
Under a tax credit system, each of the taxpayers would
receive the same amount of tax credit for the same amount of
charitable contribution. The credit would be refundable to taxpayers
who incurred no tax liability in the year; hence, the taxpayer with no
taxable income would receive a refund equal to the value of the tax
credit. In Canada, assuming the same loss in government revenues
for a tax credit scheme as for the present charitable deduction under
the present tax system and rates, a tax credit would be approximately
28 percent of the charitable donation.142 Hence, in the example
discussed here, the taxpayers with marginal rates of 50 to 20 percent
would each receive a credit against their tax liabilities of $28. The
1 4 1 Report, vol. 3, supra, note 1 at 222.
1 4 2 R.D. Hood, S.A. Martin & L.S. Osberg, "Economic Determinants of Individual
Charitable Donations in Canada" (1977) 10 Can. J. Econ. 653 at 667.
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taxpayer with no tax liability would receive a refund of $28.
Notwithstanding the equity argument, the Carter Commission
did not recommend the adoption of a tax credit system. The reason
probably was somewhat more complicated than the one it gave in
the Report. In its Report, the Commission said that a change to a
credit system would tend to "stifle" giving by upper-income
taxpayers.143 It is true that the cost of a charitable donation to
higher-income taxpayers would be greater under a tax credit system
than under the present tax deduction. Therefore, they could be
expected to make fewer donations. On the other hand, the cost of
a charitable donation would go down for lower-income taxpayers,
and their donations could be expected to go up. Thus, the result of
substituting a credit for a deduction is not so much that total
charitable donations will go down144 as that the donations will be
distributed differently between higher- and lower-income taxpayers.
The significance in the change of contribution patterns to
charity arises from the fact that lower-income taxpayers generally do
not contribute to the same types of charities as higher-income
taxpayers. Lower-income taxpayers give a very high percentage of
their donations to religious organizations and, to a lesser extent, to
certain social welfare agencies. Higher- income taxpayers tend to
give to educational and cultural charities.145 Thus a change from a
deduction to a credit has profound implications for the funding of
education and the arts.
Given the equity-distribution conflict, the choice between the
deduction and the credit is not obvious. Of course, there are those
who argue that equity is important enough to override concerns
about decreased funding for certain long-established institutions.1 46
1 4 3Report, vol. 3, supra, note 1 at 222.
144It is assumed that the price elasticity of contributions at every income level is about
the same.
1 4 5 R.M. Bird & M. Bucovetsky, Canadian Tax Reform and Private Philanthropy (Toronto:
Canadian Tax Foundation, 1976) at 10.
1 4 6 N. Brooks, Financing the Voluntary Sector: Replacing the Charitable Deduction
(Toronto: Law and Economics Workshop Series, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto,
1981).
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On the other hand, there are those (including the Carter
Commissioners) who feel that the continuation of funding for
education and the arts is important enough to disregard the obvious
inequity of the deduction. Perhaps one way that a choice can be
made between the deduction and the credit is to examine how either
fits in with the two or three most important justifications for tax
concessions to charity.
The traditional justification for tax concessions to charity is
that charities do what government would otherwise have to.
Therefore the question is: does a tax deduction or a tax credit give
more support to charities doing what government would otherwise
have to do? The question cannot be answered definitely without
more empirical research. However, some observations can be made.
There is a spectrum of charitable activities. On one end, there are
social welfare activities. The role of these charities is to try to fill
in the gaps and to assist the government in providing minimum
social justice. Arguably, in the words of one commentator, the
government should be "totally committed to social welfare."147 At
the other end of the spectrum, there are religious activities in which,
again arguably, the government should be totally uninvolved. In the
middle, education leans towards the social welfare end, and arts and
culture towards the religious end. On balance, one would think that
the current charitable deduction gives more support to charities that
do what government would otherwise have to do.
There is considerable debate, however, over the redistributive
effects and uses of contributions to religious organizations. Some
commentators have said that a small percentage of contributions to
religious groups gets used outside the group or for social welfare
purposes. On the other hand, the Interfaith Research Committee
of the Filer Commission estimate that at least one-fifth of religious
giving goes to non-sacramental uses.148
The other commonly cited justifications - or justification,
since they are linked - for tax concessions to charities is that
charities are a counterbalance to government and business, that they
147bid at 8.
1 4 8 Commission of Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, supra, note 8 at 57.
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promote the development of alternative strategies to deal with social
and economic problems, and that they reinforce the underpinnings
of a pluralistic society. To the extent that the credit will permit
more taxpayers to participate in the charitable sector, then arguably
the pluralistic society is strengthened. A counter-argument, however,
is that pluralism is something more than the ability to decide what
institutions in society will provide what public goods. Simply, an
argument may be made that some institutions are richer contributors
to the social, cultural, and intellectual mosaic than others. Hence,
it may be possible to justify a system of deduction that is skewed in
the direction of the favourite charities of upper-income taxpayers.
C. The Scope of Related Business
The history of the introduction of the related-business
provisions into the Income Tax Act has already been given. Since
then, there have been few Canadian court cases149 on whether a
business is a related business. The situation in Canada is in notable
contrast to that in the United States, where a myriad of cases have
been heard. The reason for the different experiences is not clear.
Modest empirical research, however, indicates that there is
considerable uncertainty in the field about the scope of related
businesses and the propriety of various income-generating activities
carried on by charities. It appears to be quite possible that the
related-business issue will assume some importance in the
foreseeable future.
V. CONCLUSION
The recommendations of the Carter Report on the tax
treatment of charities and charitable donations are, to reiterate,
more interesting for what is omitted than for what is proposed.
With twenty years' hindsight, it is clear that the Commission failed
to anticipate the nearly inevitable changes in the relationship
49Alberta Institute on Mental Retardation v. The Queen, [19871 2 C.T.C. 70 (F.C.A.).
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consummated through the tax system between the government and
the voluntary sector. Thus, in contrast to most of the Report, the
Commission's work on charities and charitable donations is not of
continuing relevance.
